THE COURT SHOULD HAVE REMAINED SILENT:
WHY THE COURT ERRED IN DECIDING
DICKERSON V UNITED STATES
ERNIN CHEMERINSY
I.

THE UNDERLYING ISSUE IN DICKERSON . UNTE= STATES:
WAS THE CONSTiTuTONALtY OF § 3501
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT?

The Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson v. United States will be
most remembered for its emphatic reaffirmation of Miranda v. Aiizona.1' Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in a seven to
two decision in Dickerson, declared: "We do not think there is such justification for overruling Miranda. Miranda has become embedded in
routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become
part of our national culture."3
Dickerson also will be remembered, especially by students of constitutional law and the federal court system, for its importance in defining the relationship between Congress and the Supreme Court in the
area of constitutional remedies. The issue before the Court in Dickerson was the constitutionality of a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501,
which sought to overrule Miranda v. Arizona. Adopted as part of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 3501 provided
that confessions shall be admissible in federal court so long as they are
voluntary. 4 The statute declares:
"In any criminal prosecution
brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession.., shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given."5 The
statute's goal, as the Court observed in Dickerson, was to overrule
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Mirandav. Arizona and restore the law to what it was before 1966.'
In Dickerson, the Court held that Miranda v. Arizona is "constitutionally based" 7 and states a "constitutional rule."' Therefore, the
Court held § 3501 unconstitutional because, of course, "Congress may
not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the
Constitution." 9 If the Court had ruled otherwise, Congress and the
states would have had the authority to eliminate the requirement for
Miranda warnings. More generally, if the Court had decided that
Mirandawas just "constitutional common law,"10 then that might have
opened the door for Congress to eliminate other judicially created
remedies in constitutional cases. If Congress could overrule the
Court's command that confessions be excluded from evidence if they
were obtained without proper administration of Miranda warnings,
then perhaps it could also overturn judicial orders in other cases, such
as for busing in school desegregation litigation or for damages in suits
against federal officers.
Dickerson thus will be remembered both for its practical significance in requiring that the police and courts continue to follow
Miranda and for its broader theoretical significance in limiting the
ability of Congress to overturn such judicially created devices for protecting constitutional rights. Unfortunately, what seems surely to be
forgotten about Dickerson is how the issue of the constitutionality of
§ 3501 was raised at all. Neither party-not the prosecutor, the
United States, nor the defendant-invoked § 3501. Instead, it was
presented to the United States Court of Appeals in Dickerson by a conservative public interest group in an amicus curiae brief and argued to
the Supreme Court by an attorney for that group who was appointed
by the Court. The only hint of this in the Supreme Court's decision is
in a footnote in which Chief Justice Rehnquist states: "Because no
party to the underlying litigation argued in favor of section 3501's
constitutionality in this Court, we invited Professor Paul Cassell to assist our deliberations by arguing in support of thejudgment below.""
This simple statement fails to disclose that the United States Department ofJustice, the prosecutor, made the conscious choice in the
6 Dickerson, 120

7 Id. at 2334.
8

S. C. at 2332.

Id. at 2336.

9 Id. at

2332.

10The phrase was coined by Henry P. Monaghan in Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1975).
n Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335 n.7.
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United States District Court, the United States Court of Appeals, and
the Supreme Court, not to invoke § 3501. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated in Dickerson:
[T] he applicability of § 3501 was not briefed by the Government on appeal. We note, however, that this was no simple oversight. The United
States Department of Justice took the unusual step of actually prohibiting the U.S. Attorney's Office from briefing the issue. To be sure, this
was not an isolated incident. Over the last several years, the Department
of Justice has not only failed to invoke § 3501, it has affirmatively impeded its enforcement.
Indeed, almost without exception, every justice Department since
1968 has refused to invoke § 3501 and has taken the position that
§ 3501 is unconstitutional in that Congress impermissibly sought to
overrule a Supreme Court decision that interpreted the Constitution.' , Although federal prosecutors have an obvious desire to have
confessions used as evidence against criminal defendants, for over
thirty years the statute has not been used by justice Department attor14
neys.
Nor was it invoked in the prosecution of Charles Thomas Dickerson. Dickerson was arrested and indicted for bank robbery.5 Dickerson made incriminating statements to federal agents, but the United

States District Court suppressed the confession on the grounds that
Miranda warnings were not properly administered. 6 The United
States Govemment appealed solely on the issue of whether there had
been a violation of Miranda. In its brief to the Fourth Circuit, the
Government declared: "[W]e are not making an argument based on
section 3501 in this appeal." 7 The Washington Legal Foundation, a
conservative public interest group, filed an amicus curiae brief in the

12

United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 680-81 (4th Cir. 1999) (footnote omit-

ted), rev'd,120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
13 See Eric D. Miller, Comment, Should Courts Consider18 U.S.C. § 3501 Sua Sponte?,

65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (1998) (indicating that the Nixon Justice Department
used the statute, but since then the statute has not been relied on by federal prosecutors).
14 Justice Scalia observed: "In fact, with limited exceptions
the provision has been
studiously avoided by every Administration, not only in this Court, but in the lower
courts, since its enactment more than 25 years ago." Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.

452, 463-64 (1994) (ScaliaJ., concurring).

1 The facts are set forth in detail in the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Dickerson, 166
F.3d at 673-77.
16 See id. at 671 ("[T]he district court erred in
suppressing Dickerson's voluntary
confession on the grounds that it was obtained in technical violation of Miranda.").
17 Id. at 695 (Michael,J., dissenting) (quoting Appellant's Opening Brief at 34).
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Fourth Circuit urging the court to raise § 3501 sua sponte.
The Fourth Circuit accepted this invitation and gave the following
explanation:
Dickerson voluntarily confessed to participating in a series of armed
bank robberies. Without his confession it is possible, if not probable,
that he will be acquitted. Despite that fact, the Department of Justice,
elevating politics over law, prohibited the U.S. Attorney's Office from arguing that Dickerson's confession is admissible under the mandate of
§ 3501. Fortunately, we are a court of law and not politics. Thus, the
Department ofJustice cannot prevent us from deciding this case under
18
the governing law simply by refusing to argue it.
The statement is remarkable in its assumption that the Justice Department's choice to refrain from invoking § 3501 was based on a desire for political gain. There is no imaginable political benefit to the
incumbent administration from not using § 3501. The reality, of
course, is that the prosecution of Dickerson, whether it led to a conviction or acquittal, would have no political significance whatsoever.
He is one of countless individuals prosecuted by the United States
every day for federal crimes. If the Fourth Circuit had not chosen his
case as the vehicle for invoking § 3501, the case would have attracted
no attention. More importantly, today's politics obviously favor the
Justice Department using § 3501 and gaining convictions. The general public does not want criminals to get off on what it sees as "technicalities" and surely would prefer the government to use § 3501
where necessary to gain the admission of confessions and ultimately
convictions.
The Fourth Circuit falsely attributed a political motive to the Justice Department to pave the way for it to consider § 3501 sua sponte.
In doing so, the Fourth Circuit obscured the Justice Department's
choice to refrain from using § 3501 because of a view that the statute
is unconstitutional. Although the Justice Department wants convictions at least as much as the Fourth Circuit, for over thirty years it has
refused to invoke the statute even in cases where it might have made
the difference between the government winning or losing. By trivializing the Justice Department's refusal to invoke § 3501 as a mere "political" choice not based on "law," the Fourth Circuit ignored an extremely important underlying issue: is it appropriate for a federal
court, on its own, to invoke a federal law not pertaining to the court's
jurisdiction, over the objections of the federal prosecutor?

18 Id. at

672 (citation omitted).
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The United States Supreme Court simply assumed that the issue
of the constitutionality of § 3501 wras properly before it. As mentioned
above, it appointed Paul Cassell, the attorney for the conservative public interest group and a law professor who long has criticized Miranda,
to brief and argue the case.19 Not a single justice in Dickerson questioned whether it was appropriate for the federal courts to invoke
§ 3501 when the federal prosecutors had expressly chosen not to do
SO.
Nor is it likely in hindsight that there will be attention to how
§ 3501 and its constitutionality was raised in Dickerson. Those who
wanted to see Miranda reaffirmed, and who are thus happy with the
Court's ruling, certainly have no reason to complain over the decision. Conservatives, who wanted Miranda overruled, are in no position to complain because conservative opponents of Miranda brought
the issue to the Supreme Court. In Davis v. United States, in 1994, Justice Scalia urged in a concurring opinion that federal courts consider
§ 3501 sua sponte in a future case. ° A conservative public interest
group and a conservative panel of the Fourth Circuit followed this
suggestion and raised the constitutional issue decided in Dickerson. As
much as conservatives such as Justice Scalia lament the Court's choice
in Dickerson to reaffirm Miranda v. Arizona,21 they cannot and surely
will not complain that the Court reached the issue improperly.
Thus, the story of how § 3501 came to be considered in Dickerson
at most will soon be a forgotten historical footnote to an important
1,Articles written by Paul Cassell, a law professor at the University
of Utah School

of Law, criticizing Mirandav. Arizona, and arguing that it has led to the release of many
criminals, include Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's
Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1084 (1996); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An
EmpiricalReassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. R.EV. 387 (1996); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles,
Handcuffing the Cops : A Thirty Year Perspectiveon Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN.L. REV. 1055 (1998). For the arguments of others who strongly dis-

agree with Professor Cassell see, for example, Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: SubstantialBenefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500
(1996) (asserting Mirandasafeguards do not pose any serious impediment to effective
law enforcement); Stephen J. Schulhofer, ReconsideringMiranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.

435 (1987) (arguing Mirandarules pose no serious problems that would make law enforcement more difficult).
2o Davis, 512 U.S. at 465 (ScaliaJ., concurring) ("The point is whether
ourcontinuing refusal to consider§ 3501 is consistent with the Third Branch's obligation to decide
according to the law. I think it is not.").
A Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent in Dickerson. Dickerson, 120 S.Ct. at 2337-48
(Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, Justice Scalia concludes his dissent by declaring.
"Today'sjudgment converts Mirandafrom a milestone ofjudicial overreaching into the
very Cheops' Pyramid (or perhaps the Sphinx would be a better analogue) ofjudicial

arrogance." Id. at 2348.
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case about criminal procedure and the relationship between Congress
and the Supreme Court. This, however, ignores the significant underlying constitutional issue raised by actions of the Fourth Circuit and
the Supreme Court. In invoking § 3501 over the objections of the
federal prosecutor, these courts violated basic principles of separation
of powers.
In this article, I argue that the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme
Court seriously erred in considering the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501. There are three separate reasons why the courts should not
have done so. First, the courts violated separation of powers by usurping the judgment of the executive branch about how to exercise its
prosecutorial authority. Second, the courts exceeded the appropriate
judicial role in raising a major constitutional issue not presented by
the parties that in no way concerned the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to hear the matter. Third, the courts ignored the legislative
history of § 3501, which clearly placed discretion with the Justice Department as to whether § 3501 would be raised. Each of these points
is developed respectively below in Parts II, III, and IV of this Article.
In other words, the actions of the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme
Court in considering the constitutionality of § 3501 presents a trifecta
of separation of powers violations: the courts simultaneously usurped
executive power, exceeded judicial authority, and undermined legislative decisions. However much one likes or dislikes the result in Dickerson, the courts' reaching the issue of the constitutionality of § 3501 is
gravely troubling.
II. THE COURTS VIOLATED SEPARATION OF POWERS BY
USURPING ExEcuTIVE POWERS

The executive branch of the federal government, through the
United States Department of Justice, interpreted the United States
Constitution and concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was unconstitutional. This was entirely within the authority and prerogatives of the
executive branch. The executive, as much as the judiciary, has the
right and duty to interpret the United States Constitution. The oath
of office of the President and the Attorney General demand that they
do so. The President's power under Article II to "take care" that the
laws be faithfully executed provides the executive with broad discretion as to when and how to conduct criminal prosecutions." The
choice of whether to proceed with a criminal case and the decisions
22 U.S. CONST. art.

II, § 3.
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about how to do so are thus entirely within the discretion of the executive branch. The Fourth Circuit's decision to invoke § 3501 over
the objections of the Justice Department, and the Supreme Court's
consideration of the issue on this basis, thus usurp executive authority
and violate separation of powers.
There is no doubt that the executive has the power and the duty
to interpret the Constitution. Constitutional interpretation is not, and
never has been, the exclusive province of the Supreme Court and the
judiciary. Every holder of government office takes an oath to uphold
the Constitution. Even if the judiciary is regarded as the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution's meaning, 3 until there is ajudicial interpretation to follow, government officials must interpret the Constitution.
Legislators must do so in drafting and evaluating proposed legislation.
Executives must do so in deciding whether to veto bills and whether
and how to enforce laws.
This view finds support from the earliest days in United States history. For example, ThomasJefferson wrote:
[N] othing in the Constitution has given [the judges] a right to decide
for the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them. Both
magistracies are equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to
them. The judges, believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a
sentence of fine and imprisonment; because that power was placed in
their hands by the Constitution. But the Executive, believing the law to
be unconstitutional, was bound to remit the execution of it; because that
power has been confided to him by the Constitution. That instrument
meant that its co-ordinate branches should be checks on each other.
But the opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws
are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in their own
sphere of action, but for the Legislature & Executive
also, in their
24
spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch.

Similarly, President Andrew Jackson declared in vetoing a bill to

recharter the Bank of the United States:
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be
guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who
Arguably, Marbury v. Madison endorses the view that the Court is the ultimate
arbiter in Chief Justice John Marshall's famous declaration: "It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803). I have previously argued that the judiciary should be the ultimate
arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution. ERWvIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE
2-1

CONSTITUTION 81-105 (1987).

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 310, 311 n.1 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, The
Knickerbocker Press 1897).
24
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takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as
he understands it, and not as it is understood by others. It is as much
the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the
President to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution
which may be presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the
supreme judges when it may be brought before them for judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress
than the opinion of Congress has2 over the judges, and on that point the
5
President is independent of both.
Interestingly, in recent years, it has been conservatives who have
most championed the authority of the executive branch to interpret
the Constitution independently. This is ironic because it was conservatives who, in their desire to see Miranda overturned, chose to disregard the executive's responsibility to interpret the Constitution. A
decade ago, then Attorney General Edwin Meese declared: "The Supreme Court, then, is not the only interpreter of the Constitution.
Each of the three coordinate branches of government created and
empowered by the Constitution-the executive and legislative no less
than the judicial-has a duty to interpret the Constitution in the performance of its official functions."26
I am not arguing here that the executive has the right to disregard
judicial interpretations of the Constitution if there is a disagreement
between the branches. The point is a much narrower and much more
unassailable one: The executive branch has the constitutional authority and the constitutional duty to interpret the Constitution. Just as a
legislator should interpret the Constitution in deciding whether to
vote for a bill, so should a prosecutor interpret the Constitution in
deciding whether to invoke a particular law.
The Constitution's text vests prosecutorial authority solely in the
executive branch of government. Article II, section 1 of the Constitution states that the "executive power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America." More to the point, Article II, section 3
declares that the President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed." The Supreme Court long has interpreted this language as
giving the executive sole authority to handle all criminal prosecutions

25 ANDREw JACKSON, VETO MESSAGE,

reprinted in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
576, 582 (James Richardson ed., Washington D.C., United States Printing
Office 1896).
26 Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution,61 TuL. L. REv. 979, 985-86 (1987).
27 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to ConstitutionalInterpreta-

PRESIDENTS

tion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975) (arguing for an independent duty of legislators to
assess the constitutionality of proposed legislation).
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on behalf of the United States government. In United States v. Nixon,
the Supreme Court declared that "the executive branch has exclusive
authority
and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a
" s
case.
The executive branch has complete discretion in deciding
whether to prosecute violators of federal statutes.
This executive
prerogative includes the ability to choose not to prosecute under federal laws that it regards as unconstitutional. Indeed, in United States v.
Nixon, the Court also declared: "In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any
branch is due great respect from the others."*
The power of the executive branch to refuse to enforce laws that it
regards as unconstitutional is a key element of the checks and balances created by the Constitution.3 The Constitution's structure requires both that two branches of government (the legislative and the
executive) participate in creating a law, and that two branches of government (the executive and the judiciary) participate in enforcing a
law. Either branch, in either situation, can interpret the Constitution
and prevent a law from being enacted (subject to override of the veto
by Congress) or from being enforced.
The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the authority of the
32
executive to refuse to enforce laws that it regards as unconstitutional
For example, Justice Scalia has observed that the President has "the
power to veto encroaching laws or even to disregard them when they
.2

418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citing Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454

(1869)).
- See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) ("In
the ordinary
case, 'so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.'"
(quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978))).
418 U.S. at 703.
See Christine E. Burgess, Note, Mewn May a PresidentRefuse to Enforce the Law?, 72
TEX. L. REv. 631, 633 (1994) ("[A] President may refuse to enforce certain provisions
of legislation because of the provisions' purported unconstitutionality." (footnote
omitted)); see also Arthur S. Miller, The President and the FaithfulExecution of the Laws, 40
V ND. L. Rrv. 389, 399 (1987) ("Executive officers, particularly those in high-level positions, administer statutes as they think is best (rather than as Congress spoke) and
are limited only by the pressures of politics, including judicial decisions, rather than by
the interdicts of law.").
3"See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926) ("Article II grants to the
President the executive power of the Government, i. e. [sic], the general administrative
control of those executing the laws .... ").
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are unconstitutional." 3 In fact, there is a strong argument that the
President must refuse to enforce laws that he regards as unconstitutional in order to be faithful to the oath to uphold the Constitution.m
This means, of course, that the executive branch had the authority
to conclude that § 3501 was unconstitutional and, therefore, not to
invoke that statute, just as it has the right to choose not to prosecute
under any federal statute that it deems unconstitutional. Moreover,
the prosecutorial discretion vested in the executive branch provides it
with complete control over criminal prosecutions. The executive,
alone, decides whether to prosecute, what charges to bring, what evidence to present, and what arguments to make. Judge Bork, for example, observed:
[T] he principle of Executive control extends to all phases of the prosecutorial process.... If the execution of the laws is lodged by the Constitution in the President, that execution may not be divided up into segments, some of which courts may control and some of which the
President's delegate may control. It is all the law enforcement power
and it all belongs to the Executive.!
Thus, the Fifth Circuit observed that "courts are not to interfere with
the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the
United States in their control over criminal prosecutions. " "
The United States government could have chosen not to prosecute Charles Thomas Dickerson for bank robbery, and no court could
review that decision.3 7 In fact, even if a grand jury indicted Dickerson,
federal prosecutors had complete discretion to refuse to proceed with
the matter. Once the government decided to prosecute Dickerson,
it was entirely the choice of federal prosecutors as to what crimes to
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
33

34

See Walter Dellinger, Legal Opinionfrom the Offwe of Legal Counsel to the Honorable

AbnerJ. Mikva, 48 ARK. L. REV. 313, 315-17 (1995) (describing situations in which the
President is duty-bound not to abide by certain statutory enactments in order to take
care that the law be faithfuifly executed).
35 Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (BorkJ., concurring).
36 United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (en
banc).
37 The judiciary can hear claims of impermissible selective prosecution.
See, e.g.,
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (explaining that the executive may not selectively prosecute based on "an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification"). Selective prosecution, however, is used to protect against improperly motivated prosecutions, not to force the government to prosecute any
specific individual or group of individuals.
38 See Cox, 342 F.2d at 172 (explaining that a federal prosecutor
may not be compelled by the court to sign an indictment prepared by a grand jury).
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charge.3" Moreover, as the case proceeded to trial, it was completely
within the discretion of the prosecutors as to what evidence to present
against Dickerson. The government, for example, could have chosen
to not present Dickerson's confession as evidence. It is unthinkable
that a federal court could order the United States Attorney prosecuting the case to introduce Dickerson's confession against him if the
prosecutor had made the choice, for whatever reason, to forego that
evidence.
If the government could decide not to use Dickerson's confession,
it then follows that it could choose to use it only subject to whether
the court decided that Mirandawarnings were properly administered.
In other words, the prosecutor was making an implicit choice that it
would use confessions only under certain circumstances. These obviously included determining that the confession was reliable, that it was
incriminating, and that on balance it would do more to help the
prosecution than harm it. The United States Department of Justice
also made the judgment that it would use confessions only if there
were no violations of Miranda v. Arizona. This gave the executive
branch complete authority to ignore § 3501 and decide that it would
use confessions only when courts found that Miranda warnings were
properly administered.
It thus violates separation of powers for a court to invoke § 3501
and consider a confession in circumstances in which the Justice Department chose not to use it. That is exactly what the Fourth Circuit
did. The Justice Department expressly told the court that it was not
invoking § 3501, and thus, that it would use the confession only if the
courts found that Mirandawarnings were properly administered. The
Fourth Circuit disregarded this executive decision and ruled that the
confession's admissibility was to be decided based on § 3501.40
Separation of powers is violated either when one branch prevents
another from carrying out its constitutional powers, or when one
"q
'Courts may initiate prosecutions, but only for criminal contempt because the

court is upholding its own authority in such situations. See Young v. United States ex
tel. Vuitton et Fils SA, 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987) (holding, in part, that federal district
courts have the authority to appoint private attorneys to prosecute criminal contempt
actions based on the "long settled [rule] that courts possess inherent authority to initiate contempt proceedings for disobedience to their orders"); Miller, supranote 13, at
1055 n.129 ("The one exception to the rule that courts may not order prosecutions
arises in the context of contempt proceedings.").
+. I also argue below that this made the Fourth Circuit's decision an impermissible
advisory opinion because the courts ultimately could not force the prosecutors to use
the confession as evidence at the subsequent trial.
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branch takes over the functions of another branch. Justice Powell explained that "the doctrine [of separation of powers] may be violated
in two ways. One branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's
performance of its constitutionally assigned function. Alternatively,
the doctrine may be violated when one branch
assumes a function
4
that more properly is entrusted to another."
The Fourth Circuit violated separation of powers in both of these
ways. The Fourth Circuit usurped the executive's sole discretion to
decide how to handle a criminal prosecution. The court also prevented the executive branch from making the choice as to the circumstances under which it would use Dickerson's confession as evidence.
The Supreme Court erred in not reversing the Fourth Circuit on this
basis, but instead choosing to review the merits of the Fourth Circuit's
decision on the constitutionality of§ 3501.
There are two arguments that might be made in response to this
position. One is that § 3501 is directed at the courts, not the executive. Justice Scalia took this position in Davis v. United States, when he
said that "[s]ection... 3501 of Title 18 is a provision of law directed to
the courts."42 The basis for this conclusory statement is unclear, however.43 The argument seems to be that § 3501 determines the admissi41

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omit-

ted).

42 512

U.S. 452, 465 (1994) (ScaliaJ., concurring).
Devins forcefully makes this argument and states: "The 1968 statute,
18 U.S.C. § 3501, is a command to the courts, not to the executive branch." Neal Dev43Professor

ins, Asking the Right Questions: How the CourtsHonored the SeparationofPowers by ReconsideringMiranda, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 264 (2000). The core of Professor Devins argu-

ment is that the "rule of law" requires that courts correctly apply the law and that the
judiciary thus needed to consider § 3501 sua sponte to ensure the law was properly applied.

There are several problems with this argument. First, the argument wrongly as-

sumes that inaccurate applications of the law are inconsistent with the "rule of law."

To the contrary, there are many instances in which the legal system accepts incorrect
applications of the law. For instance, the "independent and adequate state grounds
doctrine" provides that state court decisions that are totally wrong as to federal law will
not be reviewed by the Supreme Court if they also rest on an independent and adequate state law grounds of decisions. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDICTION
665 (3d ed. 1999) ("[T]he doctrine permits inconsistent and incorrect interpretations
of federal law to remain unreviewed.").
Also, and even more closely analogous, courts will allow evidence in at trial, even
though prohibited under the Rules of Evidence, if parties do not object or object on
the wrong grounds. The result is that the law of evidence is not followed. The adversary system, which often allows parties to choose what arguments to make, inevitably
means that courts, at times, incorrectly apply the law.
Second, Professor Devins mischaracterizes the legal issue before the courts in arguing that they would misapply § 3501 unless it was raised sua sponte. The issue raised by
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bility of evidence and that rulings about this are within the domain of
the judiciary.4 Although, undoubtedly, judges decide whether evidence is admissible, the choice whether to introduce evidence is entirely within the realm of the prosecutor.
Imagine, for example, that the Federal Rules of Evidence were altered to create a new exception to the hearsay rule. If federal prosecutors decided that the new provision was unconstitutional as violating
the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment, they could choose
never to raise that exception to the hearsay rule as a basis for introducing evidence. The judiciary decides on the admissibility of evidence, but the prosecutor decides what arguments to make in favor of
its admission. If the prosecutor chooses not to use the testimony or
decides to argue for its introduction without using the new exception,
there is nothing a court can or should do.
The above example is directly analogous to § 3501. The federal
government had expressly chosen to use confessions as evidence only
when federal courts found no violation of Miranda v. Arizona. Federal
prosecutors might have decided-but did not-to make use of confessions when they met the more relaxed voluntariness standard of
§ 3501. Clearly, this was a choice for the prosecutors, and Justice
Scalia is wrong in saying that it was a choice for the courts. As former
Attorney General Benjamin R-Civiletti argued:
[T] he Judicial Branch may not interfere with the discretion of the Executive as to how it will seek to enforce the law. This principle ofjudicial
non-interference extends to such basic subjects as what evidence to introduce, what witnesses to call, or what legal arguments the prosecutor
the defendant, Dickerson, was that the admission of his confession would violate the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The United States Government's
argument is that it would not violate the Fifth Amendment because Mirandawarnings
were properly administered. Thus, the sole issue was whether admitting the confession
would violate the Fifth Amendment. The constitutionality of § 3501 was totally irrelevant to the legal issue before the court: whether admitting the confession violated the
Fifth Amendment.
Professor Devins argues that "the Fourth Circuit thought it had a choice between
(a) applying the correct legal standard and allowing the admission of a valid confession or (b) applying the wrong legal standard and keeping the confession out of evidence." Devins, supra, at 269. This ignores another a third option before the Fourth
Circuit: rule solely on the issue presented to it by the parties, whether the admission of
Dickerson's confession violated the Fifth Amendment. The courts could have applied
the correct legal standard--Miranda v. Arizona-to this question.
See Miller, supranote 13, at 1057 ("[There is] a fundamental difference between
control over whether to begin or end a prosecution and control over what arguments
may be considered when the prosecution is carried on in court. The former is committed exclusively to the executive. The latter.., is generally within the domain of the
judiciary.").
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will present in opposition to defense motions to suppress evidence. Interference by an Article III court with the prosecutor's discretion on
these basic questions impinges upon the Executive's constitutional[]
authority.
A second argument for the court raising § 3501 sua sponte is that
unless the court did this, the constitutionality of the provision never
would be considered by the judiciary. The Fourth Circuit made this
point in justifying its action:
Because the Department of Justice will not defend the constitutionality
of § 3501-and no criminal defendant will press the issue-the question
of whether that statute, rather than Miranda, governs the admission of
confessions in federal court will most likely not be answered until a
46
Court of Appeals exercises its discretion to consider the issue.
But this argument begs the question of whether such inaction justifies the court raising the issue sua sponte. Consider any federal statute which is not enforced by the Justice Department because of its
stance that the law is unconstitutional. The federal courts are denied
any opportunity to rule on its constitutionality until either a federal
prosecutor brings an action or a party initiates a declaratory judgment
action challenging it. No court has the authority to raise a statute sua
sponte in order to consider its constitutionality.
Moreover, the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that federal
courts are not justified in hearing matters otherwise not properly before them, so as to ensure a judicial ruling on a constitutional issue.
For instance, the Court has ruled that plaintiffs who lack standing because they assert generalized grievances cannot have their claims
heard simply because, otherwise, no court would be able to hear the
matter. In United States v. Richardson, the plaintiff claimed that the
statutes providing for the secrecy of the Central Intelligence Agency
budget violated the Constitution's requirement for a regular statement and accounting of all public expenditures. 47 The Court ruled
that the plaintiff lacked standing because his case presented a generalized grievance; the plaintiff did not allege a violation of a personal
constitutional right, but instead claimed injury only as a citizen and
taxpayer. The Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing because
he was "seeking to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air

45Brief of Amicus Curiae Benjamin R. Civiletti at 11-12, Dickerson v. United
States,

120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525).
Dickersn, 166 F.3d at 683.
47418 U.S. 166, 168-69 (1974).

2000]

THE COURT SHOULD HAVE REMAINED SILENT

' s
his generalized grievances about the conduct of government.
The Court deemed irrelevant the plaintiff's claim that if he could
not sue, no one could. The Court stated:

It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue,
no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument
that the subject matter
is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and
i
49
ultimately to the political process.
Likewise, the appropriate check on the executive branch's exercise of discretion in not invoking § 3501 is through the political process. As Judge Michael of the Fourth Circuit argued in his dissenting
opinion: "The majority's fallback position is that if we do not press
the use of § 3501, no one else will. This overlooks Congress. If another branch is to question and investigate the executive's 30-year policy of not using § 3501, it should be Congress."' ° Congress certainly
could investigate the failure to use § 3501 and the resulting effects,
and perhaps try to "prod" the Justice Department to change its position.5'

Moreover, a presidential candidate could raise the prior administration's failure to invoke § 3501 as a political issue. This is not unrealistic in light of the importance of crime as an election issue and
strong public support for ensuring that the "guilty" are convicted and
not released on what are perceived as "technicalities."
The desire to rule on the constitutionality of a law simply does not
justify the courts raising it sua sponte. The Fourth Circuit, and ultimately the Supreme Court, violated separation of powers by invoking
and considering § 3501 over the objections of the executive branch.

48 Id. at

175 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 179. Similarly, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208 (1974), the Court denied citizen and taxpayer standing to plaintiffs who sued to
enjoin members of Congress from serving in the military reserves. The Court said:
"Our system of government leaves many crucial decisions to the political processes.
The assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing." Id. at 227.
Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 697 (Michael,J., dissenting).
Id. at 697-98. Congress, too, could intrude on separation of powers depending
on how it tried to exercise control over prosecutions. This obviously would depend on
what Congress chose to do.
V
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III. THE COURTS VIOLATED SEPARATION OF POWERS BY RAISING § 3501
WHEN NONE OF THE PARTIES TO THE LITIGATION DID SO

Apart from the Court's intrusion on the powers of the executive
branch, there was a distinct violation of separation of powers: the judiciary exceeded its own authority by raising and considering § 3501
when none of the parties did so. The nature of the adversary system is
such that courts are to rule on the arguments made by the parties to
the litigation only. Except for issues of subject matter jurisdiction, it is
not for the courts to raise arguments themselves. In addition to the
prudential justifications for this rule, there is a strong constitutional
basis: the courts in this case put themselves in the position of rendering unconstitutional advisory opinions.
None other than Antonin Scalia, while a judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, declared:
"The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not
sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially
as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them." 2 Indeed, this is a core characteristic of the adversary system: a passive decisionmaker who rules on the arguments made by
the parties. Professor Stephan Landsman explains: "The adversary
system relies on a neutral and passive decision maker to adjudicate
disputes after they have been aired by the adversaries in a contested
"5
proceeding. "
Indeed, such judicial passivity, with judges solely deciding the issues raised by the parties, is crucial to maintaining the fairness and integrity of thejustice system. Professor Landsman continues:
Adversary theory further suggests that neutrality and passivity are essential not only to ensure an evenhanded consideration of each case, but
also to convince society at large that the judicial system is trustworthy.
When a decision maker becomes an active questioner or otherwise participates in a case, she is likely to be perceived as partisan rather than
4
neutral. Judicial passivity helps to ensure the appearance of fairness.5

In fact, in Dickerson, the Fourth Circuit invoked § 3501 over the ob-

jections of the parties precisely because it wanted to reach a particular
result: upholding its constitutionality. Justice Scalia obviously had the
same motivation in his opinion in Davis v. United States, when he urged
52

Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

5s STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADvERsARIAL JUsTICE:

APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 2 (1988).
54Id
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courts to consider § 3501, because he spoke of how the Justice Department's failure to use that statute "may have produced... the acquittal and the nonprosecution of many dangerous felons."5'
The principle that courts should rule solely on the issues and arguments raised by the parties serves many laudable goals. As one
commentator summarized:
First, when an issue is considered sua sponte, parties lack notice that it
will be raised. This may be unfair to litigants (and potential intervenors
or amici) who may see the case decided against them based on an argument that they had no chance to rebut.... Second, sua sponte consideration of issues is an inefficient use of judicial resources. Courts are
able to save time by relying on litigants to present arguments in cases....
Third, it may seem unseemly for a court actively to seek out its own issues
to consider.
The only exception to this principle is that courts are required to
raise issues of subject matter jurisdiction even if the parties do not do
so. 7 This is in accord with the principle that "federal court jurisdiction cannot be gained by consent of the parties." Allowing, and indeed requiring, courts to raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
sua sponte engages the important -alues of federalism and separation
of powers. "[L]imiting federal court authority preserves the role of
the state courts. Also, constraining federal judicial power helps to
limit the role of the judiciary in the federal system."59
Section 3501, however, is obviously not in any way jurisdictional.
Nor do the justifications for allowing courts to raise subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte apply to it. The Fourth Circuit thus exceeded
the properjudicial role when it chose to raise § 3501 as a basis for allowing Dickerson's confession into evidence even though none of the
parties asked the court to do so.
One response to this argument is that it is entirely prudential: although it is not a constitutional requirement, prudent judicial administration demands that the courts wait for the parties to raise arguments. Nor is the principle of restraint-that federal courts should
avoid constitutional questions-a constitutionally mandated require-

512 U.S. at 452 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
supra note 13, at 1050.
See, e.g., ML Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278

"0 Miller,
5

(1977) ("[WIe are obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction.").
CHEMERINSIW, supranote 43, at 259.
Id.
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ment. 6° There certainly is an argument, from a separation of powers
perspective, that courts exceed their proper role when they disregard
the basic principles of the adversary system and decide a constitutional issue not presented by the parties and unrelated to subject matterjurisdiction.61
In Dickerson, however, the reason the Fourth Circuit acted unconstitutionally in considering § 3501 is clear: it rendered an unconstitutional advisory opinion. The Supreme Court did the same when it reversed the Fourth Circuit and upheld the constitutionality of § 3501.
The prohibition against federal courts issuing advisory opinions is at
the very core of Article I1.62 As the Court explained in Flastv. Cohen:
[T]he implicit policies embodied in Article III, and not history alone,
impose the rule against advisory opinions.... [The rule] implements
the separation of powers... [and] also recognizes that such suits often
are not pressed before the Court with that clear concreteness provided
when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision
from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaced situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests.6

The Fourth Circuit's decision to invoke § 3501 clearly put it in the
position of issuing an advisory opinion. Imagine if the Supreme Court
had affirmed the Fourth Circuit, upheld the constitutionality of
The classic statement ofjudicial avoidance is byJustice Brandeis in Ashwander
v.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis,J., concurring) (explaining how "[t]he Court
developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision"); see also Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding
ConstitutionalQuestions,35 B.C. L. REV. 1003 (1994) (analyzing the historical development and implementation of, as well as the justification for, the "last resort rule").
61I am not arguing that courts on their own should never raise issues of law
except
for subject matterjurisdiction. The question of when, if at all, courts should do this is
a difficult question, but one that need not be answered to demonstrate that the courts
acted inappropriately in raising § 3501 sua sponte. The argument is that courts act
inappropriately in raising legal issues when they (a) undermine prosecutorial discretion; (b) risk rendering advisory opinions; or (c) ignore legislative intent to leave
choices to the executive. As argued throughout this paper, the courts were wrong to
raise § 3501 sua sponte for all of these reasons. Although Professor Devins presents
several examples where courts raised issues on their own, see Devins, supra note 43, at
258-62, in none were any of these factors present. For example, Professor Devins
points to Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), as an instance of the Court
raising a legal issue on its own. Erie, however, was a private tort suit; no issue of prosecutorial discretion or executive interpretation of the law was present. Nor did Erie risk
an advisory opinion; the Court's determination of the law to apply was decisive as to
the outcome of the case. Nor, of course, was there any argument that the legislature
had left any choices to executive discretion.
62 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43,
at 48.
63 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968) (citations and quotations omitted).
6o
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§ 3501, and ruled that Dickerson's confession would be admissible if it
were voluntary. The case would have been remanded to the United
States District Court for a determination as to whether the confession
was voluntary, and ultimately, for trial.
At that point, the United States government could simply have
chosen to proceed without the confession or even to dismiss the
prosecution against Dickerson. As explained earlier, the Justice Department has made the implicit choice that it will use confessions,
even if voluntarily obtained and admissible under § 3501, only when
Miranda warnings were deemed by the federal courts to have been
properly administered. The rulings by the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court that § 3501 was constitutional would have been entirely
an advisory opinion in the context of Dickerson's case.
It is firmly established that in order for a case to bejusticiable and
not an advisory opinion, there must be a substantial likelihood that a
federal court decision in favor of a claimant will bring about some
change or have some effect. This requirement can be traced back to
the Supreme Court's earliest days. In 1792, the Court considered
Hayburn's Case to determine whether federal courts could express
nonbinding opinions on the amount of benefits owed to Revolutionary War veterans." Congress adopted a law permitting these veterans
to file pension claims in the United States circuit courts. The judges
of these courts were to inform the Secretary of War of the nature of
the claimant's disability and the amount of benefits to be paid. The
Secretary could refuse to follow the court's recommendation.
Although the Supreme Court never explicitly ruled the statute
unconstitutional, five of the six Supreme Court Justices, while serving
as circuit court judges, found the assignment of these tasks to be unconstitutional. The Justices explained that the duty of making recommendations regarding pensions was "not of a judicial nature. " '5
They said that it would violate separation of powers because judicial
action might be "revised and controlled by the legislature, and by an
officer in the executive department. Such revision and control we
deemed radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial
power which is vested in the courts. " 66

In other instances, the Supreme Court has said that a case is a
nonjusticiable request for an advisory opinion if there is not a substan-

k5

2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 408 (1792).
I& at 411.

66Id
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tial likelihood that the federal court decision will have some effect.
For example, in Chicago & South Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
the Supreme Court said federal courts could not review Civil Aeronautics Board decisions awarding international air routes because the
President could disregard or modify those judicial rulings.
The
Court declared:
Judgments within the powers vested in courts by [Article III] may not
lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another
Department of Government. To revise or review an administrative decision which has only the force of a recommendation to the President
would be to render an advisory opinion in its most obnoxious form.8
There is a striking analogy between these cases and Dickerson. If
the Court had upheld § 3501, the judiciary would have advised that
Dickerson's confession could be admitted under § 3501; the executive
branch would have listened to that advice and then could have decided not to use the confession. The Court's rulings would truly have
been nothing but an advisory opinion. This is the inevitable result of
a court raising and considering an issue such as this on its own. The
prosecutor has complete discretion as to what evidence to present.
For a court to act as the Fourth Circuit did necessarily risks an advisory
opinion as the Justice Department inescapably has the last word: it

decides whether to present the confession as evidence, as well as
whether to proceed with the criminal prosecution.

Thus, basic principles of the adversary system, prudent judicial
administration, and the prohibition against advisory opinions all support the well-established rule: only issues of subject matter jurisdiction should be raised sua sponte by courts; for all other issues, courts
should rule solely on the matters raised by the parties. The Fourth
Circuit and the Supreme Court acted improperly in disregarding this
keystone aspect of the American judicial system.69
67

333 U.S. 103, 110 (1948); see also United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (40 How.) 13

(1852) (denying jurisdiction because the Secretary of Treasury could refuse to pay

claims under a treaty if the claims were deemed not to be just and equitable).
Chi. & S. AirLines, 333 U.S. at 113.

69

Professor Devins makes the clever argument that the failure of the courts to con-

sider § 3501 would have meant that they were rendering advisory opinions. Devins,
supra note 43, at 265-66. This argument, however, is based on an inaccurate definition
of what constitutes an advisory opinion. In order for a case to avoid being an impermissible advisory opinion, two requirements must be met: there must be an actual dis-

pute between adverse litigants and there must be a substantial likelihood that a federal
court decision in favor of a claimant will bring about some change or have some effect.
CHEMERINSKY, supranote 43, at 51. Both of these requirements were met in Dickerson
without the consideration of § 3501.

There obviously was a dispute between the
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IV. CONGRESS LEFT TO THEJUSTICE DEPARTMENT THE CHOICE AS TO

WHETHER TO INVOKE

§ 3501

The separation of powers problems discussed in the prior two
Parts are particularly acute with regard to § 3501 because the legislative history clearly shows that Congress intended to leave to the executive branch the choice as to whether to invoke that provision. An
amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Dickerson, by the House Democratic Leadership, carefully reviewed the legislative history of § 3501
and persuasively argued that Congress meant to leave the issue of
§ 3501 entirely in the hands of the executive branch. The brief states:
A review of Section 3501's background and legislative history reveals that
Congress provided little or no basis for expecting the executive branch
to mount a successful challenge to Miranda. Before enactment, the executive branch had manifested (with strong support in Congress) its
commitment to adherence to Miranda practices and to Miranda'sapplication, especially in federal cases.70

The provision was favored by those "much more interested in an
election-year symbolic statement about law and order than in mounting an effective challenge to Miranda."71 The amicus brief thus observes: "In context, Congress had every reason to expect and to inhas not
tend what ultimately transpired, namely, that section 3501
72
Miranda."
challenge
to
branch
executive
been used by the
When § 3501 was first enacted, the Justice Department, via a letter
from the Attorney General, informed the Senate Judiciary Committee
that the proposal to overrule Miranda was unconstitutional. 7' ThenPresident Lyndon B.Johnson, in a letter to the Senate Majority leader,
said that the bill raised "grave constitutional questions."74 In response
to this, Congress, in an election year compromise and to make a
statement about law and order, included the provision but left it to
United States and Dickerson over whether his confession would be admitted. Also, the
court's decision on the Miranda issue would be dispositive as to whether the confession
would be admitted. In other words, the court's ruling obviously would have an effect.
The court thus did not need to consider § 3501 in order to avoid rendering an advisory
opinion.
,, Brief of Amicus Curiae House Democratic Leadership at 5, Dickerson v. United
States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No 99-5525). An excellent review of the legislative history of § 3501 is found in Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85
CORNELL L. REX. 883 (2000).
71 Brief of Amicus Curiae House Democratic Leadership at 5, Dickerson v. United
States, 120 S. CL 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525).
7Z Id. at
8.
7i Id. at 12.
71

Id. at 16.
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the executive branch to decide whether to invoke it in the future.
Congress expressly deleted a proposal to apply § 3501 to the states and
this clearly reflected the choice to let the Justice Department decide
whether to ever use the law. As Professor Charles Tiefer, the author
of the amicus brief, wrote: "By eliminating the provisions that would
have let state authorities challenge Miranda, the amending Senators
set up a situation where they had every reason to expect that it remained up to the federal Attorney General whether to mount a challenge to Mirandausing the pared-down Title II."75
The Fourth Circuit's choice to raise § 3501 over the objections of
federal prosecutors is thus inconsistent with the legislative judgment
that it was for the Justice Department to decide whether to invoke the
statute. Every time Congress enacts a law, it knows that its enforcement depends on the actions of the Justice Department. That is inherent in the system of checks and balances and separation of powers
created by the Constitution. The Fourth Circuit and the Supreme
Court violated these principles by considering the constitutionality of
§ 3501 in Dickerson.
CONCLUSION

The system of separation of powers embodied in the United States
Constitution reflects the judgment that the ends do not justify the
means when it comes to allocating government power. The means
matter enormously. The Fourth Circuit obviously very much wanted
to uphold the constitutionality of § 3501 and its overruling of Miranda
v. Arizona. The Supreme Court was just as anxious to decide the constitutional question, although with seven Justices concluding that
§ 3501 is impermissible. But both courts violated basic principles of
separation of powers in considering the issue at all because it was not
raised by the parties.
This aspect of Dickerson should not be forgotten or ignored. The
courts should have exercised their right-in fact, their constitutional
duty-to remain silent on the issue of § 3501's constitutionality until
and unless it was raised by the United States Department ofJustice in
a criminal case.

7

Id. at 17-18.

